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Introduction 
The rejection of the Lisbon Treaty by the electorate 
on 12 June 2008 has presented the Irish government 
with the most serious crisis in external relations 
since the Second World War. This was the third 
such referendum on Europe held in Ireland since the 
millennium and the second plebiscite in three to 
result in a rejection of an EU Treaty following the 
failed Nice poll in 2001. There is no obvious 
solution to the dilemma the government faces and 
no obvious pathway to achieve ratification. There is 
however a clear consensus amongst the political 
parties that ratification constitutes both a clear 
political priority and a fundamental national interest. 
At the October European Council summit in 
Brussels, Taoiseach Brian Cowen promised to come 
back to the December meeting “with a view to our 
defining together the elements of a solution and a 
common path to follow”.
1 But the external context is 
now clear – EU leaders indicated an unwillingness 
to re-negotiate any part of the Treaty: it will be up to 
Ireland to find an Irish solution to this European 
problem. Thus the opportunity cost of the No vote 
has become somewhat clearer: Ireland faces 
marginalisation and isolation in Europe if a solution 
to the Lisbon dilemma is not found. The domestic 
context is also somewhat clearer now that we have 
access to extensive data that sheds light on the 
reasons for the No vote in the 12 June poll. In 
assessing the options for ratification this paper 
draws upon that data, presented in among other 
sources, the post-referendum Eurobarometer survey 
                                                      
1 “Ireland promises Lisbon clarity in December”, EU 
Observer.com, 15 October 2008 
(http://euobserver.com/9/26942). 
and the government-commissioned Millward Brown 
IMS research findings.
2 
Any course of action that involves another 
referendum campaign implies significant risks for 
the Irish government and for Ireland’s position 
within the European Union. The principal danger 
here lies in the continuing knowledge deficit 
regarding EU affairs: fully 42% of respondents 
polled by Millward Brown cited a “lack of 
knowledge/information/understanding” as their 
reason for voting No to Lisbon.
3 But the threat to 
Ireland’s national interests, to the country’s long-
term economic prosperity and international relations 
are very grave and now necessitate the most 
substantive engagement by political actors. This 
paper seeks to contribute to the debate on 
ratification and to provide policy-makers with an 
assessment of the options before them. Before 
proceeding to outline those options it sets out four 
key assumptions upon which the arguments made 
are based. It also outlines the importance of securing 
a clarification of the constitutional position via a 
Supreme Court ruling on the constitutionality of the 
Lisbon Treaty and the desirability of finding EU 
agreement on the right of all 27 member states to 
permanent representation on the European 
Commission.  
                                                      
2 European Commission, “Post-referendum Survey in 
Ireland”,  Flash Eurobarometer 245, 18 June 2008; 
Millward Brown IMS, “Post-Lisbon Treaty referendum 
research findings September 2008”, p.i 
3 Millward Brown IMS, ibid. 2 | John O’Brennan 
Key Assumptions 
Assumption 1: The Irish government’s clear aim is 
to remain a full member of the European Union with 
all the rights that membership conveys and the 
responsibilities it entails. Ireland’s fundamental 
national interest demands that any tendency toward 
drift or to some sort of detached relationship with 
the EU should be resisted. The fact that almost 90% 
of the elected representatives in the Dáil support the 
ratification of the Lisbon Treaty and are opposed to 
any development that would leave Ireland 
marginalised and isolated in Europe is a significant 
plus as options for ratification are considered. But 
there have been some worrying signs that, in the 
aftermath of the referendum, both Fine Gael and the 
Labour party have begun to move away from the 
well-established consensus on Europe that has been 
an enduring feature of the Irish party system. The 
recent turmoil in global financial markets underlines 
the vital importance of EU membership as an anchor 
of Ireland’s economic and geopolitical relations. 
Thus the threat to Ireland’s national interests 
represented by a failure to ratify Lisbon demands 
unity of purpose amongst the main political parties 
and no second referendum could be contemplated 
without this. 
Assumption 2: The other 26 member states of the 
European Union proceed to ratify the Lisbon Treaty 
according to their domestic constitutional 
procedures by early 2009. This will leave Ireland as 
the only state not to have ratified the Treaty and thus 
the only state then blocking ratification. Once we 
reach a point where all other 26 member states have 
actually ratified the Treaty the political pressure on 
Ireland will increase significantly. Although in a 
small number of member states there are pending 
constitutional challenges, this paper takes as a point 
of departure the certain ratification of Lisbon by all 
the other 26 member states of the Union.
4 
Assumption 3: The other 26 member states of the 
EU will not open up the Lisbon process to re-
negotiation. Already many member state 
governments, as well as the current French 
Presidency of the EU, have gone on record to note 
                                                      
4 Ratification has now been completed in 22 member 
states. In the Czech Republic the Constitutional Court 
will deliver a ruling sometime in October 2008. In 
Sweden the parliament will vote in the autumn. The 
Polish case is more complicated as ratification has been 
approved by both government and parliament but the bill 
awaits the President’s signature. Similarly in Germany 
President Kohler awaits a decision of the Constitutional 
Court. See Piotr Maciej Kacynski, Sebestian Kurpas and 
Peadar O’Broin, Ratification of the Lisbon Treaty: 
Ireland is not the only problem, EPIN Working Paper No. 
18, CEPS, Brussels, September 2008. 
their absolute opposition to the idea of any re-
negotiation. That opposition is based on the view 
that once one aspect of the Treaty is opened up for 
re-negotiation all other parts of the agreement 
become open to contestation, re-interpretation and 
protracted disputes. This is even more true of a 
Union of 27 sovereign states than was the case in 
previous inter-governmental negotiation contexts. 
We can safely assume that this means that the 
present crisis will require (in political terms) a 
specifically Irish solution to a European problem. 
Although opponents of Lisbon argue that, in formal 
procedural terms, the Irish No vote cannot be 
ignored (the unanimity stipulation attached to treaty 
change to be found in Article 48 of the Treaty on 
European Union), the practical politics that 
characterise this impasse in EU affairs is that too 
much negotiating blood was spilt on Lisbon and its 
predecessors and there is no stomach for even a 
partial repeat of that process. Whilst there may be 
similarities to the situation Denmark found itself in 
after the rejection there by its electorate of the 
Maastricht Treaty in 1992, we have to recognise that 
the wider political context in Europe is significantly 
different now (the EU is both deeper and wider) and 
there is much less goodwill in evidence towards 
Ireland than was the case previously.  
Assumption 4: The Nice Treaty is unsuitable as a 
vehicle for achieving both institutional efficiency 
and constitutional balance as the EU goes forward. 
Although recent academic analysis suggests that the 
2004 and 2007 enlargements have not significantly 
reduced the efficiency of EU decision-making, it is 
equally clear that the policy-making agenda is much 
less ambitious than has been the case in the past: the 
European Commission as a rational political actor 
has adjusted for the new environment and scaled 
back its ambitions in a number of core policy areas.
5 
The irony here is that opinion polls throughout 
Europe (including Ireland) clearly demonstrate a 
demand for EU action in important policy areas 
such as energy security, financial regulation, 
policing, asylum and immigration, and even in 
foreign and security policy.  
Moreover the prospect of further enlargement to the 
Western Balkans (anticipated during the Lisbon 
negotiations) means that the Nice Treaty 
                                                      
5 See, for example, Sara Hagemann and Julia de Clerk-
Sachsse, Old Rules, New Game: Decision-Making in the 
Council of Ministers after the 2004 Enlargement, CEPS 
Special Report, Centre for European Policy Studies, 
Brussels, March 2007; Sebastian Kurpas, Caroline Gron 
and Piotr Maciej Kacynski, The European Commission 
after Enlargement: Does More add up to less?, CEPS 
Special Report, Centre for European Policy Studies, 
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arrangements already begin to look sup-optimal and 
institutionally outmoded for a Union of up to 34 
member states circa 2015 (not including Turkey).
6 
The recent improvement in EU-Serbia relations after 
the capture and transfer to the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) of 
Radovan Karadžić means that an important impasse 
in the enlargement process has largely been resolved 
and a period of more or less normal negotiations 
should now follow. But Ireland’s No to Lisbon has 
had a predictably negative impact on the 
enlargement framework, ironically just at a time 
when the situation in the Western Balkans has 
begun to improve. Germany and France have been 
particularly emphatic in stating that further 
enlargement cannot happen without ratification of 
Lisbon – as Bernard Kouchner put it at the EU 
foreign ministers meeting in Avignon: “No Lisbon, 
no enlargement”. In 2001, after the rejection of the 
Nice Treaty by the Irish electorate, the EU’s eastern 
enlargement was thrown into considerable doubt for 
a period. Now once again it is Ireland that is – 
rightly or wrongly – perceived to be the single 
greatest threat to the EU’s expansion into South-
eastern Europe. In this sense, as in many others, the 
rejection of Lisbon has been very damaging to 
Ireland’s reputation in Europe, especially among 
states that view the Irish positively because of the 
way the country has made a success of EU 
membership.
7 To sum up, the imperative of 
achieving a balanced constitutional order in the 
context of the ‘deepening’ and ‘widening’ impulses 
presents the EU with no option but to look beyond 
Nice for an efficient, equitable and workable 
institutional system. 
Finally, the recent conflagration between Georgia 
and Russia over South Ossetia and Abkhazia and the 
uncertain EU response also underlined for many the 
need to quickly adopt the new provisions in foreign 
and security policy envisaged by Lisbon as a means 
to achieve a more effective EU foreign policy.
8 
Russia has clearly been emboldened by recent 
events and there will be significant challenges to 
                                                      
6 The EU is currently at different stages of negotiation 
with seven different states in the western Balkans region: 
Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, FYR 
Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia. For the purposes of 
clarity I include Kosovo as an individual state entity 
though its statehood has yet to be formally recognised by 
the EU. 
7 See Croatian Foreign Minister Goran Jandrokovic’s 
interview with Jamie Smyth: “Croatia fears Ireland’s No 
to Lisbon is blocking accession”, The Irish Times, 8 
September 2008. 
8 See Jamie Smyth, “Lack of Lisbon Treaty hinders EU 
response to Russian Action”, The Irish Times, 2 
September 2008. 
confront on the Union’s eastern borders in years to 
come; the Nice provisions on foreign and security 
policy patently provide neither the institutional 
weight nor the political muscle necessary to allow 
the EU to punch its weight in the international 
arena. The sense of crisis engendered by the 
meltdown in global financial markets has also led to 
renewed calls for a speedy resolution to the Lisbon 
dilemma, most recently from Commission President 
José Manuel Barroso and French European Affairs 
Minister, Jean-Pierre Jouyet.
9 MEPs were also 
emphatic on this point subsequent to the address to 
the Parliament’s Constitutional Affairs Committee 
by Minister for Foreign Affairs, Micheál Martin, on 
6 October 2008. For all these reasons we can safely 
assume that the EU will not seek to fall back on the 
Nice arrangements in the years ahead. 
The Lisbon Treaty and the Irish 
Constitution 
Before any of the options for ratification are 
considered it is imperative that a Supreme Court 
determination on the constitutionality of the Lisbon 
Treaty be sought under Article 26 of Bunreacht na 
hÉireann, the Irish Constitution. A clarification of 
the constitutional position should have been sought 
in advance of (and, in my view, in preference to) the 
more risky route of a popular referendum on the 
Lisbon Treaty. Even in the aftermath of the 
referendum’s decisive result, a Supreme Court 
judgement would be of considerable benefit to the 
Irish government as it assesses the options (outlined 
below) for ratification.  
It is worth recalling that the 1972 amendment to 
Bunreacht na hÉireann, approved overwhelmingly 
by referendum, authorised the transfer of certain 
legislative, executive and judicial powers to the then 
European Economic Community. The amendment 
provided that Ireland could join the Communities 
and that “no provision of this Constitution 
invalidates laws enacted, acts done or measures 
adopted by the state necessitated by the obligations 
of membership of the Communities or prevent laws 
enacted, acts done or measures adopted by the 
Communities, or institutions thereof, from having 
the force of law in the state”.
10 It is unfortunate that 
the Supreme Court has not been asked to clarify the 
relationship between executive action on EU affairs 
and the domestic constitutional order since the 
celebrated Crotty case of 1987.
11 Because of this 
                                                      
9 See “Tackling of EU crisis needs Lisbon Treaty, says 
Barroso”, The Irish Times, 9 October 2008. 
10 Oireachtas, European Communities Act, No. 27/1972, 
16 December 1972. 
11 Crotty v An Taoiseach (1987) IR 713. 4 | John O’Brennan 
much of the discussion surrounding options for 
ratification of the Lisbon Treaty has been taking 
place in a legal-constitutional vacuum. As Gavin 
Barrett puts it: “It is far from clear that the 
application of Crotty would invalidate the 
ratification even of the entirety of the Lisbon Treaty 
without a referendum….(and) It is even unclear 
whether the present Supreme Court would even 
follow all of its own reasoning in Crotty…”.
12 
Therefore a Supreme Court hearing, brought under 
Article 26 of the Constitution, promises to bring 
much-needed clarity to the debate on how to 
proceed. 
Such a judgement would help clarify the nature of 
Ireland’s constitutional relationship with the EU, in 
a context where there have been significant 
economic and political developments beyond those 
which the Supreme Court justices of 1987 dealt with 
(or indeed envisaged) in the Crotty judgement 
(again, deepening and widening). Second, it would 
define precisely the position of the state in regard to 
the 1972 European Communities Act and thus 
specify whether the competence to ratify EU treaty 
changes lies with the Oireachtas (Parliament) or the 
people. Finally, it could significantly aid the 
government in choosing between some of the 
options for ratification listed below, depending on 
the stance the Supreme Court takes in interpreting 
the Lisbon Treaty.  
Should the Court identify parts of the Treaty that it 
deems to be at odds with the Irish Constitution, 
these might be put to a referendum in precisely 
defined amendments. If the option is to hold a 
second referendum it could thus greatly aid the 
process of deciding the nature and content of that 
referendum, helping to clarify whether parts of the 
Treaty could be implemented by the Oireachtas, or 
whether every part of the Lisbon Treaty required 
popular consent. Should the government decide to 
ratify the Treaty without a referendum it would run 
the risk, according to Barrett, of “having its 
knuckles rapped” by the Supreme Court. Such a 
course of action could also cause chaos throughout 
the EU “were the Supreme Court to find ratification 
without a referendum invalid only after the relevant 
Treaty purportedly came into force”.
13 Thus it can 
safely be concluded that whatever option the Irish 
government decides on for moving forward, the 
Supreme Court will play an important, if not 
decisive role, in determining the outcome of 
Ireland’s Lisbon problem. 
                                                      
12 Gavin Barrett, “Is a Second Referendum Appropriate in 
order to allow Ireland to ratify the Treaty of Lisbon?”, 
Sunday Business Post, 31 August 2008. 
13 Ibid. 
Securing a Permanent Representative 
on the European Commission 
The data presented by Eurobarometer and Millward 
Brown IMS demonstrate that one of the key reasons 
Irish voters rejected the Lisbon Treaty lay in 
concerns that Ireland’s voice and representation 
within the EU institutions would be eroded. Of 
crucial importance here was the sense that the loss 
of a permanent Irish Commissioner would deal a 
blow to Irish interests and influence, or even, as the 
Millward Brown IMS research puts it, to Ireland 
“having no voice in Europe at all”.
14 Irrespective of 
the fact that the Nice Treaty already provides for the 
loss of Commission representation as early as 2009, 
this is clearly an issue that can be resolved by 
collective action at EU level: although the Lisbon 
Treaty also mandates a Commission made up of 
nominees of only two thirds of the member states in 
any five year period it also references a potential 
recalibration of numbers (“…unless the European 
Council, acting unanimously, decides to alter this 
number”). The collective utilisation of such a 
Treaty-defined ‘escape clause’ would provide the 
Irish government with some leverage as it 
contemplates a second referendum.  
John Temple Lang and Eamon Gallagher 
demonstrate in a recent CEPS Policy Brief that the 
full significance of the reduction in size of the 
Commission under the Nice Treaty has not been 
widely or clearly understood. It means that there 
would always be, for five years at a time, one-third 
of the member states without a nominee in the EU’s 
policy-initiating and policy-implementing 
institution. They point out that amongst the six 
largest member states (France, Germany, Italy, 
Poland, Spain and the UK) there would always be at 
least  two large states without nominees, and it 
would be unlikely that those states would 
uncontroversially accept proposals or decisions 
emanating from a body on which they were not, in 
any sense, represented.
15 It is very difficult, for 
example, to envisage a future David Cameron-led 
Conservative government in the UK settling for the 
Nice status quo whilst continually coming under 
attack from the UK’s rabidly Euro-sceptic press for 
agreeing to proposals emerging from a Commission 
without UK representation. Equally, one has to ask 
whether there would develop significantly deeper 
negative perceptions of the EU in Ireland in a 
                                                      
14 Millward Brown IMS, op. cit. 
15 John Temple Lang and Eamon Gallagher, Essential 
Steps for the European Union after the No votes in 
France, the Netherlands and Ireland, CEPS Policy Brief 
No. 166, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, 
August 2008, p. 4. Ireland and the Lisbon Treaty: Quo Vadis? | 5 
context where the country was without 
representation on the Commission and yet had to 
negotiate, approve and implement laws proposed by 
that same Commission.  
It seems clear that the Yes side underestimated the 
significance of this issue during the Lisbon 
campaign in Ireland. The rationale for having a 
Commission is that the EU needs an autonomous 
body, independent of the member states, yet – 
crucially – representative of the whole Union, to 
propose policies and implement legislation agreed 
by the Council of Ministers and European 
Parliament.
16 The representative function demands 
that we now revisit the Nice arrangements and 
unequivocally invoke the clause of Lisbon that 
allows for an increase in the number of members of 
the Commission so as to grant each member state 
the right to permanent representation. It seems clear 
that the preponderance of opinion across the EU 
now favours the idea of permanent representation 
and thus the issue would seem to present much less 
difficulty for the EU as a body than anything that 
would involve opt-outs for Ireland or substantial re-
negotiation of Lisbon. For this reason it would seem 
prudent for the Irish government to secure EU 
agreement on full and permanent Commission 
representation for all as a crucial first step in trying 
to break the domestic impasse created by the 
referendum result. If opinion polls are to be believed 
it would make the task of selling a second 
referendum to the Irish people – whatever the 
precise nature of the proposition – that much easier. 
Therefore this course of action should be pursued 
independent of (and in addition to) any of the 
suggested options outlined below. 
Four Options for Achieving Ratification 
Option One: Ignore the referendum result 
and proceed to ratify the Lisbon Treaty by 
statute of the Oireachtas.  
In two opinion pieces during the summer, published 
in The Irish Times, Stephen Collins, one of Ireland’s 
most respected political commentators, argued that 
the government should take the radical step of 
ignoring or disregarding the will of the people, as 
expressed on 12 June 2008, and proceed to ratify the 
Lisbon Treaty by statute of the Oireachtas.
17 Whilst 
it is not unusual for member state governments to 
hold consultative (non-binding) referendums on EU 
                                                      
16 Ibid. 
17 Stephen Collins, “Legislative route may be best way to 
get around Lisbon”, The Irish Times, 19 July 2008; 
Stephen Collins, “Ratify Lisbon Treaty regardless of 
referendum result”, The Irish Times, 2 August 2008. 
issues, it is quite a different matter for a government 
to declare a referendum merely consultative after the 
event. The starting point for Collins (and many 
other commentators who support this position) is the 
grave threat to the Irish national interest presented 
by the failure to ratify Lisbon and the desire to 
ensure that Ireland remains inside the core decision-
making structures of the EU. He points explicitly to 
the reasoning of the justices of the Supreme Court in 
the Crotty judgement, especially that of Chief 
Justice Tom Finlay, who pointed out that in securing 
the consent of the people via the accession 
referendum in 1972, the government also received a 
rolling mandate to approve amendments to the EC 
Treaties “so long as such amendments did not alter 
the essential scope or objectives of the 
communities”. Similarly, Mr Justice Barrington 
noted in his judgement that the founders of the 
European Community had in mind “a growing 
dynamic Community gradually achieving its 
objectives over a period of time”.
18 The mandate for 
parliamentary approval of Lisbon could thus be 
traced back to the licence granted by the 1972 Third 
Amendment to the Irish Constitution. 
It could also be argued that Article 29.4.2 of 
Bunreacht na hÉireann provides the government 
with another possible ‘escape clause’. It states that 
‘in connection with (the State’s) external relations, 
the Government may adopt…any method of 
procedure used…by the members of any group…of 
nations with which the State is…associated for the 
purpose of international co-operation’. Broadly 
interpreted this could mean that because all 26 other 
member states have ratified (or will ratify) the 
Lisbon Treaty by parliamentary instruments, Ireland 
could also do so. Again, a comprehensive hearing 
by the Supreme Court would provide clarification 
on this important point of constitutional law. 
The dominant interpretation of the Crotty judgement 
was (and remains) that any further change in the EU 
constitutional order with implications for Irish 
sovereignty would have to be legitimated through 
referendum rather than parliamentary statute.
19 No 
Irish government has been prepared to challenge the 
constitutionality of an EU treaty before the Supreme 
Court since that time and no such action was 
                                                      
18 See John Temple Lang, “The Irish Court Case which 
delayed the Single European Act” (1987) 24 CMLRev 
709. 
19 On the nature and significance of the Crotty judgment 
see, for example, Gerard W. Hogan, The Supreme Court 
and the Single European Act (1987) Ir Jur 55; John 
Temple Lang, op. cit.1987; and James Casey, Crotty v 
An Taoiseach: A Comparative Perspective, in O’Reilly 
(ed.), Human Rights and Constitutional Law: Essays in 
Honour of Brian Walsh, Dublin, 1992. 6 | John O’Brennan 
contemplated in respect of the Lisbon Treaty. This 
is despite the fact that Crotty expressly authorises 
the ratification of EU treaties by statute, provided 
that “such amendments do not alter the essential 
scope or objectives” of the existing European 
Union. The only aspect of the Single European Act 
(SEA) that the Court felt required constitutional 
amendment, and this only by a 3 to 2 majority, was 
Title III, which pertained to European security and 
foreign policy. It is absolutely clear that all other 
institutional and procedural innovations contained in 
the Single European Act could as easily have been 
introduced by statute of the Oireachtas. Indeed, as 
Ruth Barrington points out, successive enlargements 
of the EU have been ratified by the Oireachtas rather 
than by referendum, and it is at least arguable that 
these have altered the essential scope and/or 
objectives of the EU far more than actual treaty 
change. Similarly, Temple Lang and Gallagher 
show that each successive enlargement has changed 
the dynamics of Irish influence and voice in EU 
decision-making procedures because each accession 
has seen changes to the weighting of each member 
state’s voting strength in the Council, as well as 
changes to key EU policies, which have moved 
from a strictly intergovernmental domain (requiring 
unanimity) to that of supranationalism (where QMV 
applies) over time.
20 Viewed from this perspective 
the government would have been perfectly justified 
in incorporating the very modest institutional 
changes attached to the Lisbon Treaty into Irish law 
by statute rather than constitutional amendment. 
Given that the Lisbon Treaty contained little or no 
movement towards further substantive ‘deepening’ 
of foreign and security policy, and leaves intact each 
member state’s absolute sovereignty in foreign 
affairs, it might have seemed to some as inherently 
sensible for the government to opt for parliamentary 
ratification or at least to test the constitutionality of 
the Lisbon Treaty before the Supreme Court in 
advance of, or in preference to, the much more risky 
route of a popular referendum. 
This is the point where one encounters the real 
world political problem presented by embracing 
Stephen Collins’ idea. The Irish government’s 
decision to proceed cautiously with the Lisbon 
Treaty and avoid a confrontation with the Supreme 
Court was based presumably on a strategic 
recognition that if the action failed it would have 
been presented by the No side as a deliberate effort 
to exclude the Irish people from the decision-
making process and thus prove a significant weapon 
in the anti-integrationist armoury in the course of a 
referendum campaign. The impression of a so-called 
‘Euro-elite’ going over the heads of the people, 
                                                      
20 Temple Lang and Gallagher, op. cit., p. 7. 
already popularly embedded (and now deployed 
regularly in the unashamedly Euro-hostile ‘Irish’ 
Mail, the ‘Irish’ Sun, the Sunday Times and other 
newspapers), would no doubt be reinforced by such 
a turn of events.
21 Thus for the Irish government 
calling a referendum on Lisbon represented the only 
sensible response to the Supreme Court’s 1987 
decision which, in Barrett's opinion, should have 
long ago been overruled or modified by the court 
itself.
22 If, in the aftermath of the referendum defeat 
the government were now to proceed exclusively 
down the legislative track and discard the 
democratically-expressed will of the people, this 
might well achieve the short-term objective of 
achieving a solution to the Lisbon conundrum. A 
Supreme Court ruling might well deem this to be 
perfectly consistent with the Irish constitution and 
the sovereignty provisions therein. And this option 
would undoubtedly prove less messy than other 
participatory routes to ratification whilst providing 
the most efficient means of bolstering confidence in 
our partner states about Irish attitudes to EU 
membership.  
The longer-term price to be paid, however, would be 
considerable: it would further alienate Irish citizens 
from the EU policy-making process; entrench the 
idea of EU and Irish elites engaging in a full-scale 
conspiracy to deny Irish citizens their say in the 
decision-making process; provide more ‘evidence’ 
of an EU bent on introducing policies at odds with 
Irish identity and values; and bestow much more 
legitimacy on the dubious range of actors loosely 
aligned in the No camp. All of this would only serve 
to deepen the chasm between elected representatives 
and citizens and potentially inflict significant 
damage on the fabric of Irish democracy. In a 
context where there has been considerable damage 
done to the architecture of public institutions by the 
banking crisis it would further reduce citizens’ trust 
in elected representatives. For all these reasons this 
option should be categorically rejected. 
                                                      
21 The European Commission has recently produced a 
report documenting how the Irish media has become 
more Eurosceptic and tabloid in recent years. The 
‘changing media landscape’ between 2002 and 2008 is 
identified as an important determinant of changes in 
public opinion which influenced the Lisbon referendum. 
See “Irish media more Eurosceptic, warns EC report”, 
The Irish Times, 2 September 2008. 
22 Gavin Barrett, “Lisbon vote is not buck-passing by 
politicians”, The Irish Times, 24 April 2008 Ireland and the Lisbon Treaty: Quo Vadis? | 7 
Option Two: Ratify parts of the Lisbon 
Treaty by legislation with a further 
referendum to follow on defined issue 
areas. 
The second option for securing ratification revolves 
around the idea of breaking up the Lisbon Treaty 
into different parts; the Oireachtas would then 
implement those parts of the document that do not 
involve any substantive change in the Irish 
constitutional order and this would be followed in 
autumn 2009 by a second referendum on the parts of 
the Treaty that are still deemed to require popular 
consent. At the Humbert Summer School in Ballina, 
Mary O’ Rourke TD (Member of Parliament) 
became the most prominent exponent of just such a 
course of action, although she seemed unclear as to 
both the modalities and the timetable for another 
referendum.
23 Senator Eugene Regan of Fine Gael 
has also developed ideas that merit close inspection. 
The benefit of such a process would be to clearly 
demarcate responsibility: the people could be asked 
to revisit certain clearly defined aspects of the 
Treaty whilst the Oireachtas enacted legislation to 
deal with the less controversial parts of the Treaty. 
The No side would be much less able to sow 
confusion because the proposed constitutional 
amendments would be much more clearly defined. 
Additional declarations on such issues as tax and 
foreign policy could accompany such amendments 
and the second referendum would take place in a 
context where EU-wide agreement had been secured 
on maintaining a permanent representative on the 
European Commission. But the question remains: 
how would the government decide exactly which 
parts of Lisbon could be adopted by the Oireachtas 
without controversy?  
The obvious starting point for adopting this 
approach would be for the government to carefully 
analyse the post-referendum surveys conducted by 
Eurobarometer and Millward Brown IMS into the 
causes of the referendum defeat. That way the most 
important concerns of the electorate could be 
isolated and decisions taken as to what measures 
could be appropriately adopted by parliamentary 
statute and what would be necessary to place before 
the people in a second referendum. The Millward 
Brown IMS research, for example, suggests that 
although lack of knowledge/information/ 
understanding emerges from the data as the most 
significant reason for voting No, specific concerns 
about neutrality, EU security and defence 
cooperation, and conscription into a putative EU 
‘army’ all featured strongly in the perceptions of No 
voters. These issues could be the subject of a 
                                                      
23 “O’Rourke supports Oireachtas vote on parts of 
Lisbon”, The Irish Times, 23 August 2008. 
precisely-defined constitutional amendment in a 
second referendum whilst the Oireachtas would be 
free to adopt the remainder of the Lisbon 
arrangements independent of the referendum.  
Such an amendment could effectively decide 
whether Ireland opts in or out of EU defence 
arrangements but allow the government to bring 
much greater coherence to the referendum 
campaign, focusing exclusively on this core issue. 
In these circumstances many of the red herrings laid 
by the No campaign in 2008 could not re-appear and 
the Yes campaign would also be much more 
effectively able to demonstrate both how the so-
called ‘triple lock’ mechanism would function and 
how Irish sovereignty in foreign affairs remains 
absolutely protected under the Lisbon 
intergovernmental arrangements.
24 The precisely-
focused amendment could also be accompanied by a 
number of declarations clarifying the position on 
abortion, corporation tax and any other issues 
deemed of significance to the electorate. In effect an 
appropriate formula for mixing parliamentary and 
popular approval could be arrived at based on the 
analysis of the data.  
But this approach still leaves the Irish government 
with a significant problem. Wouldn’t even a limited 
move in this direction attract a Supreme Court 
challenge from one or other element of the No side, 
or indeed any individual citizen of the Republic à la 
Raymond Crotty in late 1986? In the general 
atmosphere of apathy and confusion that 
characterises Irish referendums on Europe – 
confirmed by the Millward Brown IMS data – it 
might prove difficult for the Yes side to demonstrate 
that important elements of Lisbon had not been 
conspiratorially removed from public scrutiny. 
Much would depend on what emerged from a 
Supreme Court judgement on the ‘fit’ between 
Lisbon and the Irish constitution.  
It seems possible that, following the Crotty decision, 
all provisions related to foreign and security policy 
would have to go to a second referendum. Similarly 
one could envisage that some elements of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights that carry 
implications for sovereignty might also require 
popular approval, although the Supreme Court 
would have to put on a speculative hat in 
anticipating future European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
rulings flowing from the Charter. If this option were 
to be pursued it seems clear that the Supreme Court 
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would become one of the primary actors in the 
ratification process. And whilst it should be 
acknowledged that a Supreme Court determination 
on the constitutionality of Lisbon would prove very 
useful it might lead to a longer (and somewhat 
messier) timeframe for achieving ratification. 
Neither is there any guarantee that a referendum 
would approve the constitutional elements identified 
in a Supreme Court judgement as requiring consent 
by referendum. This is especially the case with 
regard to EU foreign policy and how voters perceive 
the impact on Irish neutrality, which is still widely 
viewed through emotive lenses. Even if the option is 
to hold a referendum specifically on foreign and 
security arrangements the No side would still have 
some traction in exploiting the attachment to 
neutrality and the ambiguous language that 
characterises the CFSP/ESDP Treaty articles. 
Should any part of the constitutional amendment fail 
to be passed, there would have to follow a further 
negotiation of specific opt-outs, which might prove 
difficult to secure from the European Union. For all 
these reasons this option should also be ruled out. 
Option Three:  A second referendum with 
assurances on tax, CFSP, abortion and 
Ireland’s institutional position attached as 
declarations to the Lisbon Treaty or with 
new opt-out protocols attached. 
The third option before the Irish government is to 
hold a second referendum on the Lisbon Treaty in a 
context where the proposition put to the people is 
substantially different from that of 12 June 2008, 
and where clarification has been provided on a 
range of issues deemed to be at the core of citizens’ 
concerns during the Lisbon campaign. There are 
precedents for this course of action, not just in 
Ireland but in the wider EU arena. A second 
referendum could be instituted in either of two 
specific contexts. The first is where legally-binding 
opt-outs could be attained from the EU and then put 
to the people in a second referendum on the Lisbon 
Treaty in the form of a single amendment. 
Alternatively the government could proceed to a 
second referendum without securing opt-outs but 
having received clarifications on some of the key 
issues of concern to the electorate identified by the 
Millward Brown IMS survey, such as taxation, 
neutrality and institutional representation.  
The first of these two potential paths to ratification 
would be through legal opt-outs being secured on 
certain aspects of Lisbon. In the past where 
individual member states have experienced 
difficulties (or anticipated such) with popular 
ratification of EU Treaties, the EU impulse has been 
toward providing ‘help’ in the form of legally-
binding opt-outs in specifically-defined  areas. This 
was the case in respect of the UK, Denmark and 
Ireland during the Maastricht Treaty negotiations, 
and, subsequently, for some countries, for 
membership of the eurozone also. It is clear that 
Dublin has already given this option serious 
thought. Indeed it sent a senior diplomatic mission 
to Copenhagen in August to engage with Danish 
officials and explore the technical legal parameters 
of an opt-out strategy.
25 The Irish government could 
conceivably ask for a series of protocols to be 
inserted into the Lisbon Treaty, modelled on the 
Danish approach in 1992-93, to meet the concerns 
expressed by the public during the Lisbon debate.  
The type of clauses covered by this category of 
amendments to the Lisbon Treaty includes a 
comprehensive reiteration of Irish neutrality, and 
possible opt-outs for Ireland from the European 
Defence Agency, Euroatom, or even from the entire 
structure of EU defence arrangements per se. This 
approach could also extend to a clear legally-defined 
guarantee of Irish sovereignty over direct taxation. 
A referendum campaign revolving around one or 
other of these specifically-defined amendments 
would make it much more difficult for the No side 
to obfuscate and misrepresent the Treaty in a second 
campaign. It would focus attention on a much 
narrower range of concerns than was the case during 
the 2008 referendum by providing a bounded legal 
context for the proposed constitutional amendment. 
Such protocols, because they are legally binding, 
however, present both legal and political problems 
for the European Union. There is now a strong 
opposition to this ‘pick and mix’ approach to legal 
approximation and it is quite uncertain whether 
Ireland will be offered legally binding opt-outs. This 
is not least because it might require, if not re-
negotiation of the entire Treaty, then re-ratification 
of the Lisbon Treaty in each of the other 26 national 
parliaments. There is no mood for this in EU 
capitals (especially where re-negotiation would open 
up the Lisbon process to domestic constitutional 
challenges or where it would trigger renewed 
political conflict) and for this reason it may prove an 
unrewarding course of action. It is increasingly clear 
that this option would also cause difficulties within 
the Irish government.
26 Minister of Defence Willie 
O’Dea, for one, has gone on record to voice 
opposition to the idea of opt-outs as damaging 
Ireland’s interests.
27 Specifically in regard to 
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defence policy he argues that a withdrawal from all 
EU military cooperation would present serious 
consequences for Ireland’s future UN role as the UN 
is increasingly subcontracting peacekeeping 
operations to regional bodies such as the EU. O’Dea 
asserts that the current Irish deployment to Chad 
would not be possible if Ireland were to exercise an 
opt-out from EU defence structures.
28 
Nor should one ignore the experience of Denmark 
within the EU. Policy-makers have realised that the 
price to be paid for the opt-outs they secured in the 
past – being excluded from crucial decision-making 
processes – has increasingly damaged Danish 
interests in Europe. Indeed one of the ironies of the 
current situation is that prior to the Irish referendum 
the Danish government was preparing the ground 
for a new referendum asking Danish people for 
consent to opt back into key EU policies such as 
Economic and Monetary Union. So whilst the idea 
of opt-outs is appealing in respect of the short term 
need to find a solution to the current impasse, in the 
longer term it might well prove very damaging to 
Irish interests. For this reason it should also be 
rejected. 
A second option for the government in this category 
is to proceed to a second referendum on the Lisbon 
Treaty on the basis of new (non legally-binding) 
declarations to be added to the Treaty that deal 
exclusively with Irish voters’ concerns. These might 
include any number of reassuring declarations, 
consistent with Ireland’s interpretation of the Lisbon 
Treaty, including a reaffirmation of the existence of 
national vetos on direct taxation instruments and 
WTO-related international trade agreements, along 
with further assurances about neutrality including 
explicit references to the co-called ‘triple lock’ 
mechanism and reiteration of the existing legal 
position on abortion. A second referendum 
undertaken with such declarations attached would 
not necessitate any change to the legal framework of 
the Lisbon Treaty. It would thus not require re-
negotiation or re-ratification in any of the other 26 
EU member states. Unsurprisingly this option is the 
one most favoured by many of Ireland’s partner 
states, as it presents the least difficulty for the 
European Union as a whole. 
It is worth recalling here that in 2001, after the 
rejection of the Nice Treaty, the government’s 
strategy for resolving the ratification problem 
revolved around providing the public with 
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assurances about neutrality in particular as well as 
clarifications about other issues of concern. The 
Seville Declaration (June 2002) affirmed that Irish 
neutrality was in no way threatened by the Nice 
Treaty. And although it was not legally binding, for 
the government, Seville represented a symbolically 
important collective EU recognition of the Irish 
position on security and defence.  
In many respects the format of such a second 
referendum on Lisbon would resemble that of 2002. 
A collective EU response to Irish concerns in the 
form of additional declarations and assurances 
would again provide the government with a vehicle 
to tackle the specific set of issues related to 
neutrality, sovereignty and identity in particular. 
The government could argue that it had taken 
seriously the reservations expressed by Irish citizens 
about some aspects of the European integration 
process and acted to protect Irish interests. It would 
go into a second referendum campaign on the back 
of securing EU agreement on maintaining 
permanent representation for all member states on 
the Commission. It would strongly emphasise the 
opportunity cost of exclusion from key EU decision-
making structures that would be the inevitable 
consequence of a second No vote. And it would 
presumably seek to address the information and 
communications deficit as it did successfully in 
2002. 
On the other hand the fact that these declarations 
would be merely declaratory rather than legally-
binding would present a headache for the 
government in that any second referendum would 
see the No side presenting such declarations, at best 
as completely lacking in transparent value, and, at 
worst, as a device designed to pull the wool over the 
eyes of the electorate. Other risks attached to this 
option include: resentment at having to vote again 
on something that seemed to have been 
unequivocally decided by the people; the reality that 
the core No vote has increased significantly over 
time (from 18% in 2002 to 28% in 2008); the likely 
hostility of the Euro-hostile media; the disconnect 
between political representatives and citizens on 
Europe and the lack of obvious instruments to 
bridge the gap. What is important here is to 
understand that Irish public opinion on Lisbon may 
have shifted decisively, rendering this option 
undesirable. Even if there was a manifest knowledge 
vacuum during the Lisbon referendum and many 
voters simply did not have enough information or 
knowledge to make an informed decision, opinion 
seems to have hardened in the four months since: 
any second referendum is thus fraught with risk for 
the government. Whilst there would be much less 
risk attached to going to the people with Danish-
style opt-outs included in a constitutional 10 | John O’Brennan 
amendment, a second No vote would provoke a 
paradigmatic break with Ireland’s post-
independence foreign policy. It could well mean that 
the country would be asked to voluntarily exit the 
European Union. For this reason it should be 
rejected. 
Option four: A second referendum on the 
substantive issue of whether to remain a 
member of the EU or to leave.  
The final option available to the Irish government 
might easily be termed the ‘nuclear option’ or the 
‘all or nothing’ approach, in that the question put to 
the people in a second referendum would be 
whether Ireland should remain a member state of the 
European Union or leave. The implicit assumption 
here is that in opting to remain inside the EU Ireland 
categorically accepts the Lisbon Treaty as the 
rulebook of the re-constituted EU.  
In some ways Ireland is faced with the dilemma 
faced by the UK Labour government of the 1970s. 
The UK entered the then EEC along with Ireland 
and Denmark on 1 January 1973. But the decision to 
enter the Community was perceived to lack 
democratic legitimacy in that ratification was 
achieved in parliament rather than through a popular 
referendum. The Labour government ultimately 
decided to face down its critics by offering a 
referendum on whether the UK should remain in the 
Community or depart. The referendum produced a 
large majority in favour of remaining inside the 
EEC, despite the fact that the Cabinet was divided 
on the issue: the Yes side triumphed with a vote of 
67.2% against 32.8% for the No side, on an 
exceptionally high turnout of 64.6%. The 
extraordinary success of the referendum gamble is 
reflected in the fact that the winning majority 
attained was greater than any received by a British 
government in the history of general elections. 
There are a number of grounds for arguing in favour 
of something like this type of referendum 
proposition as Ireland faces a crucial juncture in its 
EU membership.  
For one thing opinion polls continue to demonstrate 
that the Irish people remain strongly attached to the 
European Union: 73% continue to believe that EU 
membership is a good thing for Ireland.
29 The 
Millward Brown IMS research similarly found that 
60% of Irish voters believe that Irish interests are 
best pursued by remaining fully involved in the EU. 
Fewer than one in five of the electorate (18%) 
believe Ireland’s interests are best served by opting 
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to be less involved.
30 This data helps to underline 
the extraordinary gap between the continuing high 
levels of support for EU membership (70%) and the 
vote against the Lisbon Treaty (28%). Thus a 
second referendum that focuses on the macro costs 
and benefits of Irish membership of the EU rather 
than the much narrower range of concerns 
associated with a ‘Lisbon only’ referendum is much 
more likely to succeed. Discussion and debate 
would much more likely focus on ‘nuts and bolts’ 
issues familiar from domestic politics rather than 
arcane disputes about EU institutional procedures. A 
number of other factors also point strongly in favour 
of a ‘winner-takes-all’ approach. 
First, in a context where each of the other 26 
member states will have ratified the Lisbon Treaty, 
those states will have demonstrated that they accept 
the rules and procedures of the ‘club’. If that is the 
case then a ‘winner takes all’ referendum will 
implicitly acknowledge that to remain a member 
state of the EU Ireland must also agree to the rules 
and procedures ratified by the other 26 member 
states. It would be very helpful to have a Supreme 
Court ruling on the constitutionality of Lisbon: it is 
more than probable that without a request from the 
government for a Supreme Court ruling on the 
constitutionality of an In versus Out referendum, a 
challenge would materialise before the Supreme 
Court from one of the anti-integrationist groups 
prominent during the Lisbon campaign. 
Second, a referendum proposition focused on 
whether Ireland remains a member or exits the EU 
would remove the issue of so-called ‘moral hazard’ 
from a second referendum. This phenomenon 
allegedly influenced voters to vote against Lisbon 
because they perceived (wrongly as it turned out) 
that there would be no negative consequences 
attached to voting No. In other words there simply 
wasn’t enough at stake for Irish citizens to 
adequately weigh up the costs and benefits of saying 
Yes or No to something that many people professed 
not to understand or to care about sufficiently so as 
to motivate themselves, to inform themselves, or to 
get out and vote. An ‘all or nothing’ decision 
changes the dynamics of the referendum campaign 
entirely by concentrating the minds of voters on the 
real consequences of a Yes or No vote in a way that 
is not sufficiently clear during a ‘conventional’ 
constitutional referendum such as Lisbon. It would 
prevent the No side from arguing that another No 
vote would invite no serious consequences for 
Ireland. Equally it would mean a much more fully 
engaged effort by the political parties with a full 
scale replication of the sort of campaign one takes 
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for granted during general election contests.
31 An 
‘all or nothing’ referendum would thus much more 
likely resemble the original 1972 accession 
referendum where the opportunity cost of non-
membership was spelt out very starkly for Irish 
citizens. It is worth pointing out that that first 
referendum on Europe produced an overwhelming 
83.1% Yes vote on a very high turnout of 71%. An 
‘all or nothing’ referendum would almost certainly 
boost turnover significantly beyond the 55% 
achieved in 2008 (itself a considerable improvement 
on 2001 and 2002) and it is very likely that such an 
increase would favour the Yes side. 
Third, such a referendum proposition would bring 
back into play the significant economic dimension 
to Irish membership of the European Union, which 
has been marginalised in the three referendums held 
in 2001, 2002 and 2008. Ireland has received net 
receipts of approximately €40 billion since 1973 and 
in 2007 Ireland was still receiving a net amount of 
€500 million from the EU budget. When voters are 
reminded of this and the potentially catastrophic 
cost of being excluded not just from core Irish 
markets in the Single Market area but from the vital 
decision-making structures in the Council of 
Ministers and the European Central Bank to name 
just two of the most important, it reinforces what is 
at stake in a substantive decision to either remain or 
leave.
32 In a sense one might argue that this would 
help to remove the scales that have been lingering 
around Irish eyes in recent referendums. The 
extraordinary implosion of global financial markets 
will almost certainly result in Ireland experiencing a 
more serious recession than envisaged even three 
months ago. Perversely this may work to the 
advantage of the Yes side in an ‘all or nothing’ 
referendum in that Ireland’s economic future cannot 
be contemplated seriously outside of EU structures. 
Indeed at the October European Council summit 
Michael Martin, the Irish Minister for Foreign 
Affairs explicitly stated his belief that Ireland would 
have gone the way of Iceland in recent weeks were 
it not for Irish membership of the EU and the 
eurozone.
33 Similarly Taoiseach Brian Cowen has 
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identified access to the European Central Bank as 
critical to the resolution of the financial crisis in 
Ireland. EU leaders have reinforced the point by 
making explicit linkages between the financial crisis 
and the Lisbon Treaty: French Prime Minister 
Francois Fillon, for example: “We need strong 
institutions that can react to events…..It is up to the 
Irish to make up their minds on what role Europe 
can play in the economic crisis and draw the 
consequences from that”.
34 Thus the fragility of the 
European and global economy and the increasingly 
precarious Irish fiscal position have combined to 
considerably strengthen the government’s hand in a 
potential second referendum: the ‘return’ of the 
economic dimension is a potential ‘game-changer’ 
as the government contemplates how to move 
forward.  
Whilst there would still be a risk that voters would 
react badly to being faced with such a landmark 
proposition it is much more likely that this approach 
could secure a solid Yes majority than any attempt 
to simply re-run the Lisbon referendum with added 
declarations and clarifications on individual policy 
areas. If an opt-out approach is also to be rejected on 
the grounds of potentially damaging Irish national 
interests in the medium to long term then this option 
of a ‘winner-takes-all’ referendum is the only one 
that can be seriously attempted with confidence.  
Conclusions 
The failure of the Lisbon referendum in Ireland 
dramatically and decisively confirmed the 
paradigmatic change in Ireland’s relationship with 
the European Union announced by the No to Nice 
vote in 2001. At the same time it presented the 
European Union with the latest and perhaps most 
potent challenge to its ability to achieve a balanced 
and settled European constitutional order against a 
backdrop of global economic retrenchment and 
geopolitical uncertainty. The rejection of the Lisbon 
Treaty plunged Ireland into a profound political 
crisis, not least because EU leaders indicated an 
unwillingness to re-negotiate any part of the Treaty: 
it would be up to Ireland to find an Irish solution to 
this European problem. Coinciding with this 
impasse in Irish-EU relations an economic recession 
began to present serious difficulties as the public 
finances deteriorated to their worst state in 25 years, 
thus presenting Brian Cowen’s government with the 
most challenging set of circumstances in which to 
think about moving forward.  
This paper set out four possible routes to 
ratification. Although there has been limited 
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discussion of these options in public they have been 
the subject of considerable diplomatic activity 
behind the scenes as the timeframe for ratification 
becomes more pressing. Taoiseach Brian Cowen has 
promised to bring concrete proposals to the 
European Council in December. President Sarkozy 
has none too subtly hinted that he will bring his own 
ideas to the table if Dublin is found wanting. For 
Cowen and his government there is a considerable 
degree of risk attached to holding a second 
referendum, irrespective of its nature and content. 
Some of the factors to be considered include: 
resentment amongst Irish citizens at having to vote 
again on something that seemed to have been clearly 
decided by the people on 12 June; the fact that the 
core No vote has increased significantly over time 
through successive EU referendums (from 18% in 
2002 to 28% in 2008); the likely hostility of the 
Euro-hostile media; the disconnect between political 
representatives and citizens on Europe and the lack 
of obvious instruments to bridge the gap.  
Perhaps the least difficult route to ratification would 
be for the government to discard the referendum 
result and go down the parliamentary route. This 
offers the advantage of a speedy and efficient 
resolution to the problem and has been touted by a 
range of commentators as the best means of 
securing Ireland’s national interests. It is simply 
inconceivable, however, that the Irish government 
would plump for this option: it would further 
alienate Irish citizens from the EU policy-making 
process; entrench the idea of the European Union as 
an anti-democratic elitist club, and bestow much 
more legitimacy on the dubious range of actors 
loosely aligned in the No camp. All of this would 
only serve to deepen the chasm between elected 
representatives and citizens and potentially inflict 
significant damage on the fabric of Irish democracy. 
For these reasons this option should be rejected. 
The paper also considered a series of options that 
revolve around the idea of a second Irish 
referendum on Lisbon. The precedent for such a 
course of action was established with the re-vote on 
the Nice Treaty in 2002. If the government were to 
opt for this route then it would seek new assurances 
from its EU partners on a range of issues considered 
to be at the core of voters’ concerns in the No vote 
of 2008 (neutrality and taxation especially). If the 
significant knowledge and information deficit 
evident in the 2008 campaign can be addressed then 
such a referendum might very well succeed. But 
there is now a real consciousness in government 
circles that merely to secure new declarations and 
clarifications on such issues may not be enough to 
reverse the result. A more attractive option might be 
to hold a second referendum with Danish-style opt-
outs having been secured on key issues such as 
defence. It seems clear that the Irish government has 
been actively considering such a route and has now 
(belatedly) established close contact with the legal 
service of the Council of Ministers with a view to 
establishing the nature and possible shape of such 
legal measures. But whilst this approach might 
provide the government with a more ‘fireproofed’ 
amendment to place before the people, it also 
presents significant difficulties, both at EU level and 
domestically. There is significantly less goodwill in 
evidence toward Ireland now than there was 
previously and many member states deplore the idea 
of any further extension of the ‘pick and mix’ opt-
out culture. The Danish experience also suggests 
that opt-outs can prove damaging to the national 
interest in the medium to long term: exclusion from 
core decision-making institutions can lead to a 
member state’s being marginalised in some crucial 
policy areas. 
The paper argues that the only viable option open to 
the Irish government is to hold a second referendum 
on the substantive question of whether or not Ireland 
remains a member state of the EU. The first 
argument in favour of such an option is one of 
equity. Like it or not one cannot ignore the fact that 
on two occasions out of the last three Irish voters 
have said No to an EU Treaty. Assuming that 
ratification is completed by the end of 2008 in the 
26 other member states it is simply inconceivable 
that Ireland, with a population of less than 5 million 
EU citizens, can continue to block the introduction 
of a constitutional and institutional framework 
accepted by representatives of 495 million EU 
citizens. Once ratification is complete in the Czech 
Republic, Germany, Poland and Sweden, the 
pressure on Ireland to provide a solution to the 
Lisbon impasse will increase significantly as every 
other member state will have signalled that they 
accept the Lisbon rulebook. Simply put, to remain a 
member of the European Union Ireland will have to 
accept the Lisbon Treaty. In asking voters to 
endorse Ireland’s continued membership of the EU 
the proposition would also categorically imply an 
endorsement of Lisbon as the EU’s normative-
institutional bedrock. 
Irish public opinion remains uneducated about and 
indifferent to EU affairs and this is not likely to 
change anytime soon. Thus the problem of ‘moral 
hazard’ is unlikely to disappear in a second vote 
narrowly focused on the Lisbon Treaty, even if the 
government and its allies on the pro-European side 
were to run a more coherent and persuasive 
campaign. Irish citizens need to understand that 
there are serious consequences attached to voting 
behaviour. And the best way of bringing clarity to 
the referendum is to ensure that the question posed Ireland and the Lisbon Treaty: Quo Vadis? | 13 
is one which concentrates voters’ minds in the most 
substantive way.  
The most crucial factor in justifying such an ‘all or 
nothing’ referendum question, however, is that it 
brings back into play the significant economic 
dimension to Irish membership of the European 
Union, which has been marginalised in the three 
most recent referendums. It is not a coincidence that 
Irish citizens continue to be amongst the most 
supportive of the European Union: membership has 
delivered structural funds and market access, 
modernisation and prosperity, and, irrespective of 
current difficulties, most rational citizens understand 
that Ireland’s economic future is simply 
inconceivable outside of EU structures. By re-
focusing the question on Ireland’s economic well-
being and appealing to the more material instincts of 
Irish citizens, such a referendum stands the best 
chance of producing a solution to the EU’s 
protracted constitutional imbroglio.  